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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiffs brought this securities class action against 
American Home Products Corporation ("AHP") and certain 
of its directors and officers1 after AHP, in response to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The individual defendants are: (1) John R. Stafford, AHP's Chief 
Executive Officer and President, and Chairman of its Board of Directors; 
(2) Robert J. Blount, a Senior Executive Vice President and Director; (3) 
Joseph J. Carr, a Senior Vice President; (4) Louis L. Hoynes, Jr., General 
Counsel and Senior Vice President; (5) William J. Murray, a Senior Vice 
President; (6) John R. Considine, Vice President of Finance; (7) Paul J. 
Jones, Comptroller and Vice President; and (8) Fred Hassan, a senior 
executive and Director. 
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reports of serious medical side effects, withdrew its 
prescription weight-loss drugs Pondimin and Redux from 
the market. Stockholder plaintiffs allege that AHP made 
material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the 
safety of the drugs while failing to disclose several studies 
linking the drugs to heart-valve damage. As a result, 
plaintiffs claim, they suffered substantial financial loss 
when AHP's stock prices dropped following public 
disclosure of the withheld information. The District Court 
dismissed all claims on the pleadings for failure to state a 
claim, and we affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Because this is an appeal from the District Court's grant 
of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we accept as 
true all allegations in the complaint and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. See 
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Portlight, Inc., 188 F.3d 93, 94 
(3d Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth the following 
facts. 
 
A. The Heart Valve Reports. 
 
Defendant American Home Products Corporation ("AHP"), 
a Delaware corporation headquartered in New Jersey, is 
engaged in the research, development, manufacture and 
marketing of prescription and over-the-counter 
medications. During the period relevant to this litigation, 
AHP marketed the weight-loss drugs Pondimin 
(fenfluramine) and Redux (dexfenfluramine). Pondimin was 
marketed together with another drug, phentermine, in a 
combination popularly known as "fen-phen." Pondimin was 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1973. 
Redux was recommended for approval by an FDA Advisory 
Committee in November 1995 and approved by the FDA in 
1996. 
 
In February 1994, AHP learned that a Belgian 
cardiologist had documented leaky heart valves in seven 
patients who had been taking diet pills containing 
Pondimin and Redux. By the time the FDA Advisory 
Committee voted to approve Redux in November 1995, AHP 
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knew of at least 31 cases of heart valve abnormalities in 
European diet-pill users, but had informed the FDA about 
only eight of those cases. During the same time period, AHP 
also received hundreds of adverse reaction reports of 
patients displaying symptoms often associated with heart 
and lung problems. AHP represented to the FDA that these 
symptoms were reactions to the drugs and were not caused 
by any underlying heart condition. 
 
In March 1997, AHP representatives met separately with 
cardiologists from the Mayo Clinic and MeritCare Health 
Systems, who informed AHP that they had documented 
heart-valve abnormalities in a total of 17 fen-phen users. 
Dr. Heidi Connolly, the Mayo cardiologist, informed AHP 
that she had never seen this type of valve damage except in 
patients with rare cancers or in those who had taken 
ergotamine, a migraine drug that, like Redux and 
Pondimin, affects the body's serotonin level. Although AHP 
continued to investigate the Mayo data throughout 1997, it 
did not immediately release the reports to the public. 
 
The Mayo data, which by that time included 24 reports of 
heart-valve abnormalities in fen-phen users, wasfinally 
disclosed to the public on July 8, 1997. On that date, AHP, 
Mayo, MeritCare and the FDA each made a public 
announcement concerning the reports. The Mayo 
announcement noted that the information "raise[d] 
significant concern that this combination of appetite 
suppressants has important implications regarding valvular 
disease." (App. 52-53.) AHP's announcement similarly 
stated that the company was investigating "the potential 
association of valvular heart disorders with the combination 
use of [fen-phen]." (App. 56.) The Mayo, FDA, and AHP 
announcements, however, all emphasized that there was no 
conclusive evidence establishing a causal relationship 
between fen-phen and heart valve disorders and that 
further study was needed before such a link could be 
confirmed. Following these announcements, there was no 
decline in the New York Stock Exchange price of AHP 
common stock. 
 
B. The Withdrawal of Redux and Pondimin 
 
On September 12, 1997, the FDA informed AHP of a 
survey showing that 92 of 291 fen-phen users had 
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developed heart-valve abnormalities. The next business 
day, September 15, 1997, AHP announced that it was 
withdrawing Pondimin and Redux from the market. The 
same day, AHP issued a press release estimating total lost 
profits of 14 cents per share for 1997 and 1998 as a result 
of lost sales of the two drugs, as well as a one-time product 
withdrawal loss of $200 million to $300 million. On 
September 15, the day of the withdrawal announcement, 
the closing price of AHP common stock fell 3 11/16 points, 
to 73 1/4. 
 
On September 16, 1997, a Wall Street Journal article 
reported that AHP "face[s] lawsuits, including one seeking 
class-action status, from people who claim to have been 
harmed by the drugs. American Home says it is likely it will 
face legal action." (App. 103.) Nevertheless, AHP's stock 
rose slightly for the day. On September 17, 1997, articles in 
the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times reported 
that AHP had known about possible heart-valve 
abnormalities since at least March 1997, and that the 
company faced substantial personal injury liability 
exposure. That day, AHP stock suffered a 4 1/4 point 
decline, to close at 69 15/16. 
 
C. AHP's Public Statements During the Class Period. 
 
Plaintiffs allege that from March 1, 1997, through 
September 16, 1997 (the "Class Period"), AHP made 
material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the 
safety of Pondimin and Redux, as well as AHP's knowledge 
of the heart-valve reports. For example, on March 27, 1997, 
AHP issued its Annual Report, which contained a statement 
that "Redux, the first prescription weight-loss drug to be 
cleared by the FDA in more than 20 years, was one of the 
most successful drug launches ever." (App. 47.) The report 
contained no reference to either the European or the Mayo 
data. On April 21, 1997, AHP issued a press release 
addressing newspaper reports of a death that had been 
mistakenly attributed to Redux by an FDA official. The 
press release noted that "[s]cientific evidence has shown 
Redux to be safe and effective when used as indicated." 
(App. 50.) In addition, in various releases listing Redux and 
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Pondimin's side effects, AHP omitted any mention of heart- 
valve damage. 
 
Plaintiffs also contend that, following the public 
disclosure of the Mayo data on July 8, 1997, AHP issued 
further misleading statements that were designed to 
minimize the impact of that data. Although AHP's 
statements to the public discussed "a possible serious heart 
valve disorder" and "an unusual type of serious regurgitant 
valvular heart disease," AHP failed to disclose that it had 
been aware of the Mayo data since March 1997, and of the 
European data since early 1995. (App. 57.) According to 
plaintiffs, this omission served to materially mislead 
investors as to AHP's potential exposure to damages from 
products liability litigation arising out of the two drugs. 
 
D. Stock Sales By Individual Defendants. 
 
In the period between the March meeting with Mayo and 
the end of the Class Period, seven of the individual 
defendants sold a total of $40 million of AHP stock, 
resulting in profits of $25 million. Plaintiffs allege that 
these sales were consciously designed to take advantage of 
AHP's artificially-inflated stock price prior to public 
disclosure of the heart-valve data. 
 
E. The District Court Decision. 
 
Plaintiffs filed this securities class action in federal court 
on September 18, 1997, alleging that defendants violated 
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. SS 78j(b) and 78t(a), as well as Rule 10b-5, 
17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. On January 30, 1998, the plaintiffs 
filed an Amended Class Action Complaint (the "Amended 
Complaint"). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, 
and the District Court granted their motion in its entirety 
without leave for plaintiffs to amend further. See Oran v. 
Stafford, 34 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 
Finding that plaintiffs had failed to plead any material 
misstatement or omission under federal securities law, the 
court noted that on July 8, 1997--halfway through the 
Class Period--there had been full disclosure of the Mayo 
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data without any appreciable effect on AHP's stock price. As 
a result, the court concluded, "the medical data disclosed 
by AHP on July 8, 1997 was immaterial as a matter of law." 
Id. at 911. The court also held that disclosure of the 
European data and earlier adverse reaction reports would 
not have materially altered the substance of the July 8 
release. In addition, the court held that AHP's failure to 
disclose when it had first learned of the adverse health data 
was not a material omission. As to the individual 
defendants, the District Court held that the Amended 
Complaint was not pled with sufficient particularity to give 
rise to the necessary strong inference of scienter required 
under the PSLRA. Plaintiffs appealed. 
 
II. 
 
Plaintiffs raise four arguments on appeal. First, they 
claim that the District Court erred in holding that AHP's 
misstatements and omissions were not material as a matter 
of law. Second, they argue that AHP violated SEC 
Regulation S-K, Item 303(a), which requires disclosure of 
"known trends and uncertainties," and that such a violation 
can support a claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Third, plaintiffs maintain 
that the District Court erred by holding that the claims 
against AHP's insiders were not stated with sufficient 
particularity to satisfy the heightened pleading 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 
U.S.C. S 78u-4 et seq. Finally, plaintiffs claim that the 
District Court should have granted leave to amend in order 
to remedy any deficiencies in the Amended Complaint. We 
address these contentions in turn.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's dismissal of the 
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, accepting plaintiffs' 
factual allegations as true. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 
696, 707 (3d Cir. 1996). We also have plenary review over the District 
Court's interpretation of the federal securities laws. See Shapiro v. UJB 
Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1992). We review the District 
Court's denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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A. 
 
To state a valid securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5, 
a plaintiff must first establish that defendant, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security, "made a materially 
false or misleading statement or omitted to state a material 
fact necessary to make a statement not misleading." See In 
re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 
(3d Cir. 1997). The plaintiff must additionally establish that 
the defendant acted with scienter and that plaintiff 's 
reasonable reliance on defendant's misstatement 
proximately caused him injury. See In re Phillips Petroleum 
Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
The District Court held that the misrepresentations pled 
by the plaintiffs were immaterial as a matter of law, and we 
begin by addressing this issue. Plaintiffs maintain that they 
pled several material misrepresentations and omissions, 
namely: (1) that AHP failed to disclose the Mayo data prior 
to June 8, 1997, and issued misleading statements 
minimizing the import of that data following disclosure; (2) 
that AHP failed to disclose the European data and adverse 
reaction reports, even after the Mayo data became public; 
(3) that AHP misled investors by publicizing the fact of 
Redux's FDA approval without disclosing that it had 
withheld much of the European data from the FDA; and (4) 
that AHP failed to disclose when it had first learned about 
the European data, the adverse reaction reports, or the 
Mayo data. Before we address these alleged omissions and 
misrepresentations in detail, we briefly review this Circuit's 
explication of the materiality standard. 
 
Material information is "information that would be 
important to a reasonable investor in making his or her 
investment decision." Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425. 
Generally, undisclosed information is considered material if 
"there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure would 
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
`significantly altered the "total mix" of information' available 
to that investor." See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 
696, 714 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting T.S.C. Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 
In Burlington, however, this Court fashioned a special 
rule for measuring materiality in the context of an efficient 
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securities market. This rule was shaped by the basic 
economic insight that in an open and developed securities 
market like the New York Stock Exchange, the price of a 
company's stock is determined by all available material 
information regarding the company and its business. In 
such an efficient market, "information important to 
reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated into 
the stock price." Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425. As a result, 
when a stock is traded in an efficient market, the 
materiality of disclosed information may be measured post 
hoc by looking to the movement, in the period immediately 
following disclosure, of the price of the firm's stock. 
Because in an efficient market "the concept of materiality 
translates into information that alters the price of the firm's 
stock," if a company's disclosure of information has no 
effect on stock prices, "it follows that the information 
disclosed . . . was immaterial as a matter of law." 
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425. 
 
With these standards in mind, we turn to plaintiffs' 
specific allegations of material misrepresentation. 
 
1. 
 
AHP first learned of the Mayo data suggesting a link 
between fen-phen and heart-valve disorders in March 1997. 
It did not, however, release this data to the public until 
July 8, 1997. The District Court concluded that AHP's 
failure to disclose this data prior to July 8 was not a 
material omission, and we agree. 
 
Because the Mayo data was actually disclosed on July 8, 
we apply Burlington and look to the movement in the price 
of AHP's stock following disclosure to determine if the 
information was material.3 As the District Court noted, the 
July 8 disclosure had no appreciable negative effect on the 
company's stock price; in fact, AHP's share price rose by 
$3.00 during the four days after the Mayo disclosure. 
Under Burlington's market test, this price stability is 
dispositive of the question of materiality. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Plaintiffs allege that "the market for AHP common stock was an 
efficient market." Amended Complaint, para. 38. (App. 12.) 
 
                                9 
  
Plaintiffs counter, however, that this lack of adverse price 
movement may be traceable to defendant's own "spinning" 
of the Mayo data--which, plaintiffs maintain, itself 
constituted a material misrepresentation. Plaintiffs argue, 
in effect, that had AHP not deceptively downplayed the 
significance of the Mayo data through its sanguine and 
allegedly misleading statements, investors would have 
realized the import of the information, and share prices 
would have tumbled following the June 8 announcement. 
 
We reject this argument, and agree with the District 
Court that AHP's so-called "spinning" of the Mayo data was 
not materially misleading. AHP, in its public statements, 
did characterize the Mayo data as "limited and therefore 
inconclusive," and emphasized that "additional scientific 
investigation must be conducted before any possible link 
can be confirmed." (App. 56.) There is, however, nothing in 
these statements that could reasonably be characterized as 
inaccurate. The FDA's own June 8 press release confirmed 
that "[p]resently there is no conclusive evidence 
establishing a causal relationship between [Pondimin and 
Redux] and valvular heart disease." (App. 54.) Mayo's public 
statement that same day was similarly ambivalent:"We 
believe these cases raise significant concern that this 
combination of appetite suppressants has important 
implications regarding valvular heart disease. But more 
comprehensive study is needed to confirm the associations." 
(App. 52-53) (emphasis added). 
 
These third-party statements support the District Court's 
conclusion that AHP's characterization of the Mayo data as 
"inconclusive" was neither false nor misleading. Plaintiffs do 
not allege that, when AHP made its statements on June 8 
and afterward, there was any conclusive medical evidence 
linking its products to heart valve disorders. From the face 
of the Amended Complaint, then, it is clear that AHP's 
characterization of the Mayo data cannot serve as the basis 
for liability under the federal securities laws. 
 
2. 
 
Plaintiffs next argue that AHP's statements regarding the 
Mayo data must be viewed in light of the company's failure 
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to disclose the European data and the adverse reaction 
reports. In their view, had this data not been withheld, it 
would have corroborated the Mayo report and alerted 
investors to the possibility of a significant link between the 
two drugs and valvular heart disease. In particular, 
plaintiffs assert that AHP's statements characterizing the 
Mayo data as "inconclusive" became materially misleading 
in light of this additional withheld data. 
 
Plaintiffs do not allege that the European data and 
adverse reaction reports, taken by themselves, established 
any statistically significant relationship between AHP's 
products and valvular heart disease. Nor does the Amended 
Complaint assert that the withheld data, even when viewed 
in conjunction with the Mayo report, could have 
demonstrated any medically conclusive link in light of the 
millions of prescriptions written for Pondimin and Redux. 
In fact, plaintiffs never clearly explain how the 
accumulation of additional anecdotal data, short of the 
point of statistical significance, would have added anything 
to the disclosures already made on July 8, 1997. Because 
the link between the two drugs and heart-valve disorders 
was never definitively established during the relevant period 
even after the withheld data is taken into account, AHP's 
failure to disclose this data cannot render its statements 
about the inconclusiveness of the relationship materially 
misleading. 
 
AHP characterized the Mayo data as inconclusive. Had it 
simultaneously disclosed the European data and the 
adverse reaction reports, the aggregate of available 
information would nevertheless have led a reasonable 
investor to the same conclusion--that the relationship 
between the two drugs and heart valve disorders was still 
inconclusive. As the Second Circuit has noted, "[d]rug 
companies need not disclose isolated reports of illnesses 
suffered by users of their drugs until those reports provide 
statistically significant evidence that the ill effects may be 
caused by--rather than randomly associated with--use of 
the drugs and are sufficiently serious and frequent to affect 
future earnings." In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 
F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998). The withheld reports did not 
provide such statistically significant evidence. Therefore, we 
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agree with the District Court that the disclosure of the 
European data and the adverse reaction reports would not 
have "significantly altered the `total mix' of information" 
available to AHP's investors. Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 714. 
 
3. 
 
Plaintiffs next contend that they were materially misled 
about the FDA approval process for Redux. Although AHP 
had become aware of at least 31 cases of heart valve 
abnormalities in European diet-pill users by the time that 
the FDA Advisory Committee voted to approve Redux in 
1995, the company informed the FDA of only eight of those 
reports. This non-disclosure, plaintiffs contend, rendered 
materially misleading AHP's later statements about the 
approval process, which plaintiffs claim suggested that AHP 
had disclosed to the agency all available safety data.4 
 
As an initial matter, we note that plaintiffs do not allege 
that AHP withheld any information that it was legally 
required to disclose to the FDA. Certainly, the simple 
failure to disclose the additional European cases--which, as 
we have explained above, fail to establish a statistically 
significant causal relationship--cannot by itself serve as a 
basis for securities fraud liability. 
 
Plaintiffs, however, argue that AHP put the subject of 
FDA approval "in play" by publicizing the agency's 
determination that Redux was safe, and that once that 
subject was in play, AHP was required to disclose any 
material facts that would have tended to contradict its 
positive representations. Plaintiffs rely principally on 
Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 
1992), which dealt with a defendant's characterization of its 
financial management practices as "adequate." Finding that 
such a statement could, in some circumstances, be 
actionable, this Court reasoned that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For example, on August 19, 1997, AHP issued a press release stating 
that "[t]he FDA cleared Redux for marketing in April, 1996 following a 
thorough review of more than 17 clinical trials which indicated that, at 
the dose recommended for treatment of obesity, dexfenfluramine is an 
effective appetite suppressant with an acceptable safety profile." (App. 
60.) 
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       if a defendant has not commented on the nature and 
       quality of the management practices that it has used to 
       reach a particular statement of loan loss reserves, 
       earnings, assets, or net worth, it is not a violation of 
       the securities laws to fail to characterize these 
       practices as inadequate, meaningless, out of control, or 
       ineffective. However, where a defendant affirmatively 
       characterizes management practices as "adequate," 
       "conservative," "cautious," and the like, the subject is 
       "in play." For example, if a defendant represents that 
       its lending practices are "conservative" and that its 
       collateralization is "adequate," the securities laws are 
       clearly implicated if it nevertheless intentionally or 
       recklessly omits certain facts contradicting these 
       representations. Likewise, if a defendant characterizes 
       loan loss reserves as "adequate" or "solid" even though 
       it knows they are inadequate or unstable, it exposes 
       itself to possible liability for securities fraud. By 
       addressing the quality of a particular management 
       practice, a defendant declares the subject of its 
       representation to be material to the reasonable 
       shareholder, and thus is bound to speak truthfully. 
 
Id. at 281-82 (citation omitted). 
 
We do not believe that AHP's statements regarding the 
FDA approval process were materially misleading under 
Shapiro. Unlike the defendant in Shapiro, AHP did not 
make any "affirmative characterization" that the FDA's 
approval was based on a complete review of every piece of 
relevant medical information. Rather, AHP made a simple 
(and accurate) factual assertion that the FDA had found 
that Redux had an "acceptable safety profile" following a 
"thorough review of more than 17 clinical trials." (App. 60.) 
Accordingly, we find that these statements did not 
constitute any material misrepresentation or omission. 
 
4. 
 
Finally, plaintiffs charge that AHP's failure to disclose the 
dates on which it first learned of the European data, 
adverse reaction reports, and Mayo data constituted a 
material omission. This information was material to 
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investors, they assert, because of the light it would have 
cast on AHP's potential products liability exposure. 
According to the plaintiffs, the materiality of this 
undisclosed information was confirmed by the four-percent 
drop in share prices on September 17, the day that the 
New York Times and Wall Street Journal reported that AHP 
had known about possible heart-valve abnormalities since 
at least March 1997. 
 
Under the rationale of Burlington, this share price activity 
does suggest that investors viewed this final category of 
undisclosed information as material.5 This does not end our 
inquiry, however. Even non-disclosure of material 
information will not give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5 
unless the defendant had an affirmative duty to disclose 
that information. "Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not 
misleading under Rule 10b-5." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988); see also Burlington , 114 F.3d at 
1432 ("Except for specific periodic reporting requirements 
. . . there is no general duty on the part of a company to 
provide the public with all material information."). Such a 
duty to disclose may arise when there is insider trading, a 
statute requiring disclosure, or an inaccurate, incomplete 
or misleading prior disclosure. See Glazer v. Formica Corp., 
964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 1992); Backman v. Polaroid 
Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc); In re 
General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. 
Supp. 1119, 1129 (D. Del. 1988). 
 
None of these circumstances were present here. Plaintiffs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court pointed to an alternative explanation for this share 
price drop that it found more plausible: a delayed investor reaction to 
AHP's withdrawal of Pondimin and Redux two days earlier. While we 
agree that this is a reasonable explanation--more reasonable, perhaps, 
than that proffered by plaintiffs--we note that in deciding a motion to 
dismiss, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non- 
moving party. Here, there is nothing inherently implausible in the theory 
advanced by plaintiffs. Consequently, we believe that the District Court 
erred in adopting its own interpretation of the September 17 share price 
drop rather than accepting the theory put forward by plaintiffs. We 
believe, however, that this error was harmless because, as we explain 
below, plaintiffs have not pled any affirmative duty on AHP's part to 
disclose the disputed information. 
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do not allege that there was any statute requiring 
disclosure of this information.6 Nor do they allege that AHP 
was trading in its own stock during the relevant period.7 
Accord Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
 
Plaintiffs argue, however, that AHP's prior disclosures 
regarding its potential liability--particularly its July 8 
disclosure of the Mayo study--were incomplete and 
therefore misleading because they failed to mention when 
the company first became aware of the adverse heart-valve 
data. We cannot agree. As an initial matter, it is clear that 
until the FDA notified AHP on September 12 of its own data 
showing a link between the two drugs and heart-valve 
disorders, there was no statistically significant evidence 
establishing a serious health risk. Prior to that date, then, 
the threat of product liability exposure was purely 
speculative, and any evidence of when AHP first learned of 
the adverse Mayo and European data was immaterial as a 
matter of law. 
 
Moreover, AHP had no legal duty to correct or update 
even following its September 12 receipt of the FDA report. 
The duty to correct exists "when a company makes a 
historical statement that, at the time made, the company 
believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently 
discovered information actually was not." Burlington, 114 
F.3d at 1431 (quoting Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 
Inc., 51 F.3d 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1995)). Here, because AHP 
never made any prior statement regarding when it learned 
of the heart-valve data, there can be no legal duty to 
correct. 
 
The duty to update, in contrast, "concerns statements 
that, although reasonable at the time made, become 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For the reasons discussed in section IIB, infra, we reject plaintiffs' 
claim that SEC Regulation S-K, Item 303(a) imposed an affirmative duty 
of disclosure on AHP that could give rise to a claim under Rule 10b-5. 
Moreover, we note that the last of the SEC filings that are governed by 
the regulation was filed in August 1997, well before there was anything 
more than a speculative possibility of tort liability for AHP. 
 
7. We address the insider trading claims asserted against the individual 
officer-defendants in section IIC, infra. 
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misleading when viewed in the context of subsequent 
events." Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1431. After the release of 
the FDA study, which established a probable link between 
AHP's drugs and heart-valve disorders, AHP's notice of the 
earlier data could be viewed as material by a reasonable 
investor because it beared on the company's potential 
liability. Nevertheless, the omission of material information 
from a prior statement is actionable under a duty to update 
theory only if the previous statement contained an"implicit 
factual representation that remained `alive' in the minds of 
investors as a continuing representation." Burlington, 114 
F.3d at 1432. In this case, AHP never made any factual 
representation--implicit or explicit--regarding when it was 
first placed on notice about potential heart-valve problems. 
AHP's earlier statements about the Mayo and European 
data did not relate any incorrect or misleading information 
about when the company had learned of that data; rather, 
they were simply silent on the subject. In the absence of a 
misleading prior representation, AHP was under no legal 
duty to update. 
 
In short, even assuming arguendo that the date on which 
AHP was put on notice of the adverse health data was 
material at the time the public learned of it, we hold that 
AHP was under no affirmative duty to disclose this 
information under federal securities law. Therefore, this 
omission cannot form the basis for liability. 
 
B. 
 
Plaintiffs next argue that AHP had an affirmative 
obligation to disclose the heart-valve data's effect on AHP's 
future prospects under SEC Regulation S-K, Item 303(a) 
("S-K 303"), 17 C.F.R. S 229.303. S-K 303 requires a 
company to include in its SEC filings a discussion of "any 
known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the 
registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable 
or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income 
from continuing operations." 17 C.F.R. S 229.303(a)(3)(ii). 
Plaintiffs allege that by omitting material information 
concerning the link between its drugs and valvular heart 
disorder from its 1996 Form 10-K and Annual Report, and 
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its 1997 First and Second Quarter Form 10-Qs,8 AHP 
breached its duty of disclosure under the regulation. 
 
To succeed on this claim, however, plaintiffs mustfirst 
establish either that S-K 303 creates an independent 
private right of action, or that the regulation imposes an 
affirmative duty of disclosure on AHP that, if violated, 
would constitute a material omission under Rule 10b-5. We 
address these possibilities in turn. 
 
In Burlington, this Court noted that "[i]t is an open issue 
whether violations of Item 303 create an independent cause 
of action for private plaintiffs." Burlington , 114 F.3d at 1419 
n.7. Today, we hold that they do not. Neither the language 
of the regulation nor the SEC's interpretative releases 
construing it suggest that it was intended to establish a 
private cause of action, and courts construing the provision 
have unanimously held that it does not do so. See, e.g., In 
re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 
1997); In re Boston Tech., Inc., Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43, 
67 (D. Mass. 1998); In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F. 
Supp. 1202, 1209 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re F&M Distrib., 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 937 F. Supp. 647, 654 (E.D. Mich. 1996); 
Kriendler v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1140, 
1157 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 
Plaintiffs respond, however, that even if there is no 
independent private cause of action under SK-303, the 
regulation nevertheless creates a duty of disclosure that, if 
violated, constitutes a material omission under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10-b5. In 
evaluating this argument, we must examine whether the 
disclosure mandated by SK-303 is governed by standards 
consistent with those that the Supreme Court has imposed 
for private fraud actions under the federal securities laws. 
 
The SEC, whose interpretation is entitled to considerable 
deference, has characterized a company's disclosure 
obligations under SK-303 as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. AHP filed its 1996 Annual Report and Form 10-K on March 27, 1997, 
its First Quarter 1997 Form 10-Q on May 13, 1997, and its Second 
Quarter 1997 Form 10-Q on August 13, 1997. 
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       Where a trend, demand, commitment, event or 
       uncertainty is known, management must make two 
       assessments: 
 
       (1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or 
       uncertainty likely to come to fruition? If management 
       determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no 
       disclosure is required. 
 
       (2) If management cannot make that determination, it 
       must evaluate objectively the consequences of the 
       known trend, demand, commitment, event or 
       uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to 
       fruition. Disclosure is then required unless 
       management determines that a material effect on the 
       registrant's financial condition or results of operations 
       is not reasonably likely to occur. 
 
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-26831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427, 22430 (May 24, 1989). 
This test varies considerably from the general test for 
securities fraud materiality set out by the Supreme Court in 
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, which premised forward-looking 
disclosure "upon a balancing of both the indicated 
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated 
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the 
company activity." 485 U.S. 224, 237 (1988) (quoting SEC 
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(en banc)). As the SEC specifically noted, "[t]he 
probability/magnitude test for materiality approved by the 
Supreme Court in Basic . . . is inapposite to Item 303 
disclosure"; rather, SK-303's disclosure obligations extend 
considerably beyond those required by Rule 10b-5. 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-26831, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22430 
n.27. 
 
Because the materiality standards for Rule 10b-5 and 
SK-303 differ significantly, the "demonstration of a violation 
of the disclosure requirements of Item 303 does not lead 
inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would be 
required under Rule 10b-5. Such a duty to disclose must 
be separately shown." Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. 
Supp. 598, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also Sofamor,123 F.3d 
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at 402; In re Quintel Entertainment, Inc., Sec. Litig., 72 F. 
Supp. 283, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Wilensky v. Digital Equip. 
Corp., 903 F. Supp. 173, 181 & n.10 (D. Mass.1995), rev'd 
in part on other grounds sub nom. Shaw v. Digital Equip. 
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996); Kriendler, 877 F. Supp. 
at 1157.9 We find this reasoning persuasive, and thus hold 
that a violation of SK-303's reporting requirements does not 
automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 
10b-5. Because plaintiffs have failed to plead any 
actionable misrepresentation or omission under that Rule, 
SK-303 cannot provide a basis for liability. 
 
C. 
 
Having affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the 
claims against AHP, we turn now to plaintiffs' claims 
against the individual officer-defendants. The District Court 
dismissed these claims because plaintiffs' allegations 
concerning the individual defendants' motive and 
opportunity to commit fraud failed to meet the PSLRA's 
rigorous requirements for pleading scienter. The court 
noted that two of the officer-defendants, Stafford and 
Jones, were not alleged to have traded stock during the 
Class Period. As to the other officers, the court held that 
there was no allegation that their disputed trades were not 
routine or that the profits made were "substantial enough 
in relation to the compensation levels . . . to produce a 
suspicion that they might have had an incentive to commit 
fraud." Oran, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 910 (quoting Burlington, 
114 F.3d at 1423). 
 
Both the PSLRA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
impose heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs who 
allege securities fraud. Rule 9(b) requires that"[i]n all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 
1998), the Ninth Circuit held that allegations which state a claim under 
SK-303 also sufficiently state a claim under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of 
the Securities Exchange Act. The court carefully limited its holding, 
however, making clear that it did not extend to claims under Section 
10(b) or Rule 10b-5. See id. (citing In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 
865, 
870 (9th Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, Steckman does not support plaintiffs' 
position here. 
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averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity." The PSLRA more specifically requires that a 
securities fraud complaint "state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(b)(2). In 
Burlington, this Court held that a plaintiff may establish 
this strong inference "either (a) by alleging facts to show 
that defendants had both motive and opportunity to 
commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong 
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or 
recklessness." 114 F.3d at 1418; see also In re Advanta 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
The gravamen of plaintiffs' case against the individual 
officer-defendants is that they intentionally concealed 
material information in order to artificially inflate the price 
of AHP's stock, and then profited by selling their own stock 
at this inflated price shortly before the public disclosure of 
the Mayo data. 
 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Stafford and Jones traded 
no stock during the relevant period. This reason alone 
requires that we affirm the District Court's dismissal of the 
claims against these two defendants. 
 
As to the remaining defendants, plaintiffs attempt to 
show motive and opportunity for fraud by alleging that, in 
the period from May through July 1997, these seven AHP 
executives sold over $40 million of AHP stock at a profit of 
$24.98 million. The Amended Complaint sets forth the 
number of shares sold by each officer-defendant, the dates 
of the trades, and the profit realized on each transaction. 
(App. 73.) However, the Amended Complaint does not allege 
the total number of shares held by each of the officers or 
the amounts of their base compensation. The District Court 
found that the absence of this information was fatal to 
plaintiffs' case against the officer-defendants because 
"plaintiffs provide[d] no information as to whether the 
trades were normal and routine for each executive." Oran, 
34 F. Supp. 2d at 910. 
 
On appeal, appellants urge this Court to take judicial 
notice of the defendants' compensation levels and their 
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10. The Form 14As, which provide information on the executives' base 
compensation, were not presented to the District Court in any form. 
total direct stockholdings at the time of the trades. 
Appellants argue that the information is a matter of public 
record, derived from Form 4s and 5s and Form 14A Proxy 
statements filed with the SEC.10 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take 
judicial notice of facts that are "capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 
A number of our sister circuits have held that this rule 
permits a court, in deciding a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, to take judicial notice of properly-authenticated 
public disclosure documents filed with the SEC. See Bryant 
v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 
1999); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 
1018 (5th Cir. 1996); Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 
767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); see also In re Rockefeller Ctr. 
Properties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 293 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(Nygaard, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). As the Second Circuit reasoned, 
 
       the documents are required by law to be filed with the 
       SEC, and no serious questions as to their authenticity 
       can exist. Second, the documents are the very 
       documents alleged to contain the various 
       misrepresentations or omissions and are relevant not 
       to prove the truth of their contents but only to 
       determine what the documents stated. 
 
Kramer, 937 F.2d at 774. We find this reasoning 
persuasive. Moreover, we note that there is no risk of unfair 
prejudice or surprise here because defendants do not object 
to our considering the proffered forms. See Appellee's Br. 
54 n.32. Accordingly, we will take judicial notice of the SEC 
filings. 
 
Our perusal of the Amended Complaint and the SEC 
documents taken together yields the following information 
on trading activity during the Class Period: 
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Defendant Date of    Shares   Total     Percent  Proceeds      Base Pay 
          Trade      Traded   Shares    Traded  
 
Blount    6/12/1997  93,333   105,164   88.75%    $7,366,744   $650,000  
Carr      6/12/1997  20,600    44,017   46.8%     $1,606,800   $350,000  
Considine 5/6/1997   25,000    38,390   65.12%    $1,778,000   unknown 
          7/25/1997  41,800    49,803   83.93%    $3,536,280  
Hassan    5/6/1997  233,200   257,082   90.71%   $18,189,600   $589,000  
Hoynes    7/31/1997  41,800    58,527   71.42%    $3,437,632   $407,000  
Murray    5/6/1997    6,000    11,407   52.6%       $426,000   unknown  
Olivier   6/12/1997  71,200   105,899   67.24%    $5,553,600   $457,083 
 
 
While we will not infer fraudulent intent from the mere 
fact that some officers sold stock, "if the stock sales were 
unusual in scope or timing, they may support an inference 
of scienter." Advanta, 180 F.3d at 540. Defendants 
correctly note that these trades were not suspicious in 
scope; all seven of the defendants sold similar numbers of 
shares in the previous year. Indeed, a chart relied on by 
plaintiffs during oral argument on the motion to dismiss 
demonstrates that Blount, Carr, Hoynes, Murray, and 
Olivier all disposed of more shares in 1996 than in 1997. 
(App. 360.)11 
 
Plaintiffs counter, however, that the 1997 sales were 
unusual in timing because the seven officer-defendants 
sold stock during the months of May, June and July 1997 
(the three months immediately prior to the Mayo 
disclosure), while in 1996, those same defendants sold 
stock only in January, February, March, November, and 
December. However, the relevant filings show that, while 
the officer-defendants did make substantial trades during 
the Class Period, there was also significant trading activity 
throughout the rest of 1997. In February 1997--a month 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. SEC filings disclose that in the six-and-a-half month period 
immediately preceding the Class Period, the officer-defendants disposed 
of the following numbers of shares: Blount: 93,333; Carr: 63,200; 
Hoynes: 80,200; Murray: 18,000; Olivier: 130,000; Considine: 40,000. 
(Supp. App. 40-68.) 
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before AHP first learned of the Mayo data--these individual 
defendants collectively disposed of over 233,000 shares. 
Moreover, in August 1996--approximately six months 
before the beginning of the Class Period--one defendant 
(Blount) had sold an additional 177,600 shares. Taken 
together, the SEC disclosures merely reveal that the 
individual officer-defendants engaged in trading activity 
during various months in both 1996 and 1997; they do not 
demonstrate any concerted insider effort to dispose of 
shares during the Class Period. Consequently, we do not 
believe that the individual defendants' trading patterns 
establish the requisite strong inference of scienter. 
 
Nor have plaintiffs alleged facts that constitute strong 
circumstantial evidence of misbehavior or recklessness. In 
essence, plaintiffs argue that because the District Court 
found a sufficiently strong inference of conscious 
misbehavior or recklessness as to AHP, the same state of 
mind should be imputed against the individual defendants. 
This approach, however, is foreclosed by the PSLRA. This 
Court has held that "[g]eneralized imputations of knowledge 
do not suffice regardless of the defendant's position within 
the company." Advanta, 180 F.3d at 539. Plaintiffs did not 
aver which officer-defendants, if any, were aware of the 
Mayo data prior to its public release. Nor have they made 
any allegations regarding individual knowledge or 
recklessness with respect to the European data. Therefore, 
plaintiffs cannot meet the heightened pleading 
requirements under this theory. 
 
Because plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of 
alleging particularized facts that give rise to a strong 
inference of fraudulent intent, we will affirm the District 
Court's dismissal of the counts against the individual 
officer-defendants. 
 
D. 
 
After dismissing all of the plaintiffs' claims, the District 
Court denied plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. We 
review this ruling for abuse of discretion. 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure express a preference 
for liberally granting leave to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
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15(a) ("[L]eave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires."). Nonetheless, a District Court may deny leave to 
amend on the grounds that amendment would cause 
undue delay or prejudice, or that amendment would be 
futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); 
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1434. In this case, the District 
Court denied leave to amend because of undue delay and 
futility of amendment. See Oran, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14. 
 
In denying leave to amend, the District Court correctly 
noted that "[f]utility is governed by the same standard of 
legal sufficiency that applies under rule 12(b)(6)." Id. (citing 
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1435). The court had earlier 
determined that the information allegedly omitted from the 
July 8 press release was not material because it would not 
have "altered the basic mix of information" available to 
investors. In arguing that amendment would not be futile, 
plaintiffs rely on a number of "new" facts that they claim 
have emerged since the Amended Complaint was filed. See 
Reply Br. at 30. Plaintiffs attach particular importance to 
the facts that (1) the FBI has reportedly begun an 
investigation into Redux's FDA approval process, and (2) 
that AHP has reached a $4.4 billion settlement in a 
products liability class action arising from its sale of the 
two drugs. We fail to see, however, how the inclusion of 
these additional allegations would change the analysis 
underpinning the District Court's dismissal. 
 
Moreover, plaintiffs have not rebutted the District Court's 
findings regarding undue delay. The court noted that 
plaintiffs had already amended their complaint once, that 
"the case [was] already one and a half years old; no 
discovery had been taken; and plaintiffs had four months to 
file the instant Amended Class Action Complaint." Oran, 34 
F. Supp. 2d at 914. In light of these facts, we hold that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiffs leave to amend. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court is affirmed. 
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